Many people rely on online social networks as sources for news and information, and the spread of media content with ideologies across the political spectrum both influences online discussions and impacts actions offline. To examine such phenomena, we generalize bounded-confidence models of opinion dynamics on a social network by incorporating media accounts as influencers. We quantify partisanship of content as a continuous parameter on an interval, and we present higher-dimensional generalizations to incorporate content quality and increasingly nuanced political positions. We simulate our model with one and two ideological dimensions, and we use the results of our simulations to quantify the "entrainment" of non-media account content to the ideologies of media accounts in networks. We maximize media impact over a social network by tuning the number of media accounts that promote the content and the number of followers of the accounts. From our numerical computations, we find that the entrainment of the ideology of content spread by non-media accounts to media ideology depends on structural features of networks, such as size, mean number of followers, and the receptiveness of nodes to different opinions. We then introduce content quality -a key novel contribution of our work -into our model. We incorporate multiple media sources with ideological biases and quality-level estimates that we draw from real media sources and demonstrate that our model can produce distinct communities ("echo chambers") that are polarized in both ideology and quality. Our model provides a step toward understanding content quality and ideology in spreading dynamics, with ramifications for how to mitigate the spread of undesired content and promote the spread of desired content.
I. INTRODUCTION
Online social media (such as Twitter, Facebook, Instagram, and others) have become an extremely influential sources of news in daily life. For example, over two thirds of American adults who participated in a recent survey responded that social media, and their associated networks, is their primary source for obtaining news [1] . Given this large audience and the ease of sharing content online, the content that spreads on online social networks can have important consequences on public opinion, policy, and voting [2, 3] .
The spread of content depends on the response and biases of the individuals in a social network. Individual user preferences plays a strong role in the choice to consume news that conforms to (and even enhances) previously held views [4] . One reason that propaganda, misinformation, and disinformation has become so widespread on social media networks is that users are more likely to share a false or misleading story if it seems to confirm or support their biases [5, 6] . Another challenge is that content is also spread and amplified through bot, cyborg, and sockpuppet accounts [7] .
The political biases of content and the accounts that spread it goes beyond a naive separation of 'liberal' versus 'conservative', and the political spectrum of ideology can include axes for social views ('progressive' versus 'conservative'), economic views ('socialist' versus 'capitalist'), views on government involvement ('libertarian' versus 'authoritarian'), and others. Opinions can also be issue-dependent. Poole and Rosenthal [8, 9] developed methods to classify ideological positions in roll-call voting in the United States Congress in ideological space, and they found that two dimensions is typically sufficient to capture an overwhelming majority of the variance of ideologies. Their work formed the basis of the Voteview project [10] , which characterizes the ideologies of legislators in the United States Congress based on their voting records. Multidimensional political ideologies have also been explored in the context of the United States Supreme Court. For example, using a singular value decomposition, Sirovich [11] demonstrated that decisions by the judges in the second Rehnquist Court are welldescribed by a two-dimensional subspace.
Political biases are not the only way in which users judge the news that they consume and share on social media. As the prevalence of misinformation, disinformation, and "fake news" becomes increasingly prominent in everyday life and the global conversations of talking heads, social-media users are also considering the quality of news content. For example, in the aforementioned recent Pew Research Study [1] , the majority of respondents acknowledged that the news that they see, consume, and spread on social media platforms may be inaccurate. There is evidence that poor-quality content (such as so-called "fake news") travels deeper, more broadly, and faster than high-quality content (such as fact-based reporting) [12] . The same study concluded that these differences in spreading patterns are the result of human judgement, rather than arising from accounts such as bots.
A large body of work has studied the spread of content on social media [12, 13] . One approach is to mathematically model the spread of content on social media using ordinary differential equations, where the equations can capture changes in time of the proportion of a population that is "susceptible to", "exposed to", "infected with", or "immune to" the propagation of such content (e.g., a rumor) [14] [15] [16] [17] . Such compartmental models have the advantage of being analytically tractable, but they do not capture the effects of either network structure or heterogeneity in account characteristics. Other studies have focused instead on data-driven or computational approaches [4, 5, 12, 18] . One important research direction in this vein is quantifying the existence of distinct communities and "echo chambers" [19, 20] on social media, wherein individuals interact primarily with other likeminded individuals. Some recent work on modeling the spread of content has tried to bridge the gap between these two approaches by introducing mathematical models that capture the network features of social media [21] [22] [23] . Related efforts to our work in this paper include [24] , which presented an extension of an independent cascade model to explore the effects of selective exposure and connection strength on news propagation, and [25] , which developed a continuous-opinion, discrete-action model to study the emergence of extremism. Extremism in opinion dynamics models was also studied recently in the context of radicalization and terrorism [26] .
In this paper, we present a model for the influence of media accounts on the ideology and quality of content that is shared in a social network. First, we develop a general content-spreading model with an n-dimensional continuous ideology space, with spreading choices based on a bounded-confidence mechanism [27, 28] . We also model how to include media accounts as influencer nodes in the network. We conduct numerical simulations to examine the impact of media accounts for content in examples with one and two ideological dimensions. We then introduce content quality into our model; this is a key novel feature of our work. Using the resulting enhanced model, we employ numerical simulations to examine the effect of multiple media sources on the "entrainment" (with one possible uncharitable interpretation as "brainwashing") of non-media nodes in the network by media nodes.
Our work advances the study of online content spreading in several ways. In our model, we propose a measure of media impact; this allows us to quantify the influence that a set of media accounts has on the ideology of content in a social network population at consensus. Our model is not the first to propose such a mechanism, but it does have the advantage of supporting a multidimensional continuous ideology space for content. (See, e.g., [29] for a discussion of consensus in bounded-confidence models in R d .) One of the primary advances of our paper is the introduction of content quality into the spreading dynamics; to our knowledge, our model is the first to explore the effects of content quality on spreading. We believe that this is an important advancement for two reasons: (1) the quality of news content has a major effect on its spreading dynamics, and it is therefore important to study it from a dynamical perspective; and (2) the spread of poor-quality news content is a major social problem. Investigations into such problems, especially ones that produce potential mechanistic insights into them, have the potential to help motivate strategies for mitigating their effects.
Our paper proceeds as follows. In Sec. II, we develop our bounded-confidence model with content spreading. We describe a network structure that incorporates both non-media and media accounts in Sec. II A; and we introduce our dynamic content updating rule in Sec. II B. In Sec. III, we examine the dynamics of our model with one ideological dimension for content. We describe how we simulate the model in Sec. III A, and we quantify media impact for different parameter values and network architectures in Sec. III B. We present a generalization of our model to two ideological dimensions for content in Sec. IV. In Sec. V, we develop our model further to incorporate a notion of media quality into the content updating rule. In Sec. VI, we show simulations and results of media impact with the incorporation of content quality, including an example in which we draw media biases and qualities from a public hand-curated distribution. We conclude and discuss several possible extensions in Sec. VII.
II. A BOUNDED-CONFIDENCE MODEL WITH CONTENT SPREADING
A. Social network structure
Consider a social network with N non-media accounts. We represent this social network with a graph G(V N , E), where each nodes in the set V N represent an account and each edge in the set E represents a follower relationship from one account to another. Specifically, we say that account i is a follower of account j if there is a directed edge from j to i. With this structure, we can represent this social network with an adjacency matrix A, where A ij = 1 if account i follows account j and A ij = 0 otherwise. We do not assume reciprocal follower relationships, so in general A is not symmetric. We also assume that the network structure is fixed, so follower relationships do not change in time.
We now introduce media accounts into the above social network. Suppose that media accounts do not change their ideology, as encapsulated in the content that they produce, so they are not influenced by other accounts. Therefore, media accounts only have edges that are directed outward (i.e., their in-degree is always 0). We let M denote the number of media accounts and n M denote the number of followers (i.e., out-edges) per media account. We assume that each media account has the same number of followers, with one exception in Sec. VI (where we impose a media follower-number distribution based on real-world media outlets). Once we add media accounts, the total number of nodes in the network is N + M .
We represent the ideology of each account at discrete time t by x t i (where i ∈ {1, . . . , N + M }), where we take the ideology space to be continuous and bounded, such that x ∈ [−1, 1] d . We allow the ideology space to be ddimensional, so that we can be more nuanced than the typical choice in prior research of using d = 1 [30] . At time t, each account spreads content (perhaps with their own spin, as has been studied for memes using Facebook data [31] ) that reflects its current ideology x t i .
B. Content updating rule
We update content synchronously at each discrete time step in the following way. Accounts update their content by averaging the ideologies of content that they receive that is sufficiently close to their own opinion; we say that an account is receptive to such content. Accounts include their own ideology at the previous time step when determining their location in ideological space in the next step. During that step, they share content with that ideology. Accounts see content only from accounts that they follow; therefore, media accounts are not receptive to any other content. We define a receptiveness parameter c, which gives the distance in ideology within which an account is receptive. With this notation, we define the set of accounts to which account i is receptive as
We also have to decide how to measure distance dist(y) in ideological space. In general, one can consider any of various choices of metric; we will use the L p norm.
The updating mechanism for the ideology of an account is
which we can also write as
where f (x) = 1 if dist(x j , x i ) < c and f (x) = 0 otherwise. In Fig. 1 , we show a schematic of this updating rule with a small, concrete example. Our model builds on previous work in opinion dynamics. In particular, we draw our bounded-confidence mechanism from the Hegselmann-Krause (HK) [28] and Deffuant [27, 30] models of continuous opinion dynamics. Bounded-confidence updates are also related to the DeGroot-Friedkin (DF) model of social power [32] .
III. DYNAMICS WITH A ONE-DIMENSIONAL IDEOLOGY
As an example, we now examine content spreading when our model has one ideological dimension, where we ) shows their ideologies in the next time step (after we have applied the updating rule). We show M = 2 media nodes (gray circles) and N = 4 non-media nodes. To make this example concrete, focus on the yellow highlighted node. The yellow node follows 4 other accounts, two of which are media accounts and two of which are non-media accounts. If we take the receptiveness parameter to be c = 0.5, the yellow node is receptive only to content from three of these accounts (specifically, the accounts that are surrounded by dashed boxes). After averaging the content from the accounts to which it is receptive, the yellow account updates its ideology for the next time step to be x t+1 = 1 4 (0.7 + 0.5 + 0.9 + 0.9) = 0.75. During that time step, they share content with that ideology.
interpret the value x i ∈ [−1, 1] as the political perspective of the content of account i on a liberal-conservative axis. We take x = −1 to be very liberal, x = 1 to be very conservative, and x = 0 to be moderate. We use the distance dist(x j , x i ) = |x j − x i |. We then write the content updating rule for these evolving pieces of one-dimensional political content, as in Equation 2, by writing
In this example, we suppose that there are M media accounts that all have the same political opinion x M ∈ [−1, 1]. There are multiple possible interpretations of this assumption for our model system. For example, one can interpret it as M different media outlets that share the same message, which has a given political bias (as represented by a particular location in ideological space). Another way to interpret it is as one media account with M − 1 affiliated "sockpuppet" accounts, which it is using to help spread its message with the specified political bias.
A. Simulations
In each network, we suppose that there are N nonmedia accounts, and we vary the number M of media accounts and the number n M of followers of each media account. We assume that all media accounts in a given simulation have an equal number of followers, although it would be interesting to extend our model to consider drawing n M from a distribution of numbers of followers. Unless we note otherwise, we use 200 trials for each numerical experiment, and we interpret a trial to have "converged" if |x
−4 for all i for ten consecutive steps. For simplicity, we set the receptiveness parameter to take the value c = 0.5, except for Fig. 8 , where we examine the effects of varying this parameter. For a detailed discussion on the effects of the receptiveness parameter in bounded-confidence models, see [30] .
We initialize the non-media accounts to have evenlydistributed initial ideologies, so
We uniformly randomly permute the starting values of non-media nodes for each trial, so they are not spatially ordered in the network. In each trial, each media account has n M distinct followers, which we choose uniformly at random from the non-media accounts. We choose each media account's followers independently, so it is possible for a non-media account to follow multiple media accounts.
In Fig. 2 , we show examples of individual trials with different numbers of media accounts and followers per media account. We run our model on the Reed College Facebook network from the Facebook100 data set [33] . These networks are Facebook friendship networks on university campuses from one day in fall 2005; in our simulations, we use only the largest connected component of each university Facebook network to represent non-media accounts, and we note that the friendship connections between non-media accounts in these networks are bidirectional. In Fig. 2 , we show the ideology of each of the N = 962 non-media accounts on the vertical axis and the simulation time t on the horizontal axis. We take the media opinion to be x M = 0.9. These trials suggest that media nodes influence both convergence time and content-spreading dynamics. We explore these ideas further in Section III B.
B. Media influence with a one-dimensional opinion space
Our simulations of our content-spreading model suggest that the number of non-media accounts that converge to the ideological position of the media nodes (as we just illustrated for an example in which all media nodes have the same ideology) depends nontrivially both For still larger values of these parameters, splitting in ideology occurs very rapidly, resulting in a smaller fraction of non-media accounts that converge to the media's ideology. In the simulations of all three panels, we evenly distribute the initial ideologies of non-media accounts, and we set the ideological position of all media accounts to x M = 0.9.
on the number of media accounts and on the number of followers per media account. In this subsection, we present simulations that illuminate the level of media influence on a variety of real and synthetic networks. We continue to assume that all media nodes have the same ideological position.
We introduce an order parameter that we use as a diagnostic to measure the impact of media nodes on the ideological positions at convergence. Let x b i denote the ideological position of account i at convergence in the absence of media influence. We establish a mean baseline ideology R 0 by computing the mean distance between the ideological positions of non-media accounts at convergence (x b i ) and the media ideology x M . That is,
The function R 0 characterizes the mean effect on nonmedia nodes, for one trial, of the dynamics for a given network structure in the absence of media influence. Because the outcome depends on the initial ideological positions of the non-media accounts, we average R 0 over many trials.
Once we have calculated the baseline ideology R 0 , we construct a similar order parameter R i that characterizes the mean outcome of the dynamics for the same network when we introduce media nodes. Let x * i denote the ideological position of account i at convergence in a network with media influence. The resulting influenced ideology diagnostic is
The order parameters R 0 and R i allow us to quantify the impact of media nodes on the resulting content dynamics, where we note that one can also define timedependent analogs of (4) and (5). We define the media impact for one trial to be the ratio of the mean baseline ideological distance to the media-influenced ideological distance in that trial:
We can also obtain an overall media impact
by averaging the influenced opinion function R i over some number (e.g., 50) of trials. We interpret the media impact in the following way. If R = 1, the media has not had an influence on the "average" (specifically, the mean) ideological position of the non-media accounts (and the content that they spread) at convergence. If R ∈ [0, 1), the media nodes have driven the mean ideological position of the accounts to be further away from the media's ideological position than is the case without the media accounts. Finally, if R > 1, the mean ideological position of the non-media accounts (and hence of the content that they spread) is closer to the media ideology than it would be without the introduction of the media accounts, with larger values of R indicating a stronger impact. The colors represent R, the mean of the impact summary diagnostic [see Eq. (7)] for distance from media ideology over 50 trials. Blue indicates the least media impact, and red indicates the most. The media node's ideological position and the initial ideological positions of the non-media accounts are the same as in Fig. 2 . The arrows indicate the region of the plot that represents the mean media impact for each of the three figures in Fig. 2 . Equation (7) gives one of multiple possible summary diagnostics to measure media influence. Another option is to measure the mean of the distance without rescaling. (That is, one can use only the expected value of R from Eq. (5).) This alternative entails an impact level of R i ∈ [0, 2], where small values of R i represent a high degree of "entrainment" to the media ideology; that is, the media nodes have successfully influenced (e.g., "brainwashed", to describe it in an uncharitable way) many non-media accounts in the network. Large values of R i represent low levels of media influence. Using this alternative impact function for the experiments in this section gives the same qualitative results to what we report using (7).
In Fig. 3 , we illustrate media impact values for different numbers of media accounts (M ) and media followers (n M ). In color, we show the mean value of the summary diagnostic R over 50 trials. These simulations suggest a surprising result: the highest levels of adoption of media ideology do not occur for the largest values in (n M , M ) parameter space. Instead, the most successful scenario for promoting widespread adoption of the media ideol-ogy is to spread the content through a moderate number of media accounts, each of which has a moderate number of followers. This observation is consistent with some past empirical observations that accounts with a small number of follows can significantly promote the spreading of content on Twitter [34] . For a very small number of media nodes (or if the media nodes have very few followers), as in Fig. 2a , the media ideology has very low impact. A large number of media nodes with many followers per account (as in Fig. 2c ) produces some impact, but only a smaller proportion of the population (in comparison to the case with a moderate number of media accounts, each of which has a moderate number of followers, as in Fig. 2b ) in the network is influenced by the media ideology, yielding values of R in the interval (1, 2) .
In Fig. 4 , we show media entrainment values for our model for social networks from the Facebook100 data set [33] . These networks consists of people at a particular university who are connected to each other via Facebook friendships (which yield bidirectional edges) from one day in fall 2005. We add media accounts to each network in the way that we described previously for the Reed network in Section III A. For each of the examined Facebook100 networks, our simulations produce a a distinct region in each network with large media impact (specifically, R > 2). In each case, the highest level of media impact does not occur for the largest values of the two quantities in (n M , M ) parameter space.
In Fig. 5 , we show heat maps of the summary diagnostic R for media impact for a variety of synthetic network architectures, each with 100 non-media accounts. For clarity, we first briefly describe how we construct each of these networks. We show simulations for a directed ring lattice, a star, a directed variant of Erdős-Rényi (ER) networks, a directed variant Watts-Strogatz (WS) networks, and complete networks. In the star network, all non-media accounts follow one central non-media account. These edges are bidirectional, so the central nonmedia account also follows all other non-media accounts. We construct a directed ring lattice as follows. Each nonmedia account follows k other non-media account, where the ith node follows nodes {i+1, i+2, . . . , i+k} (mod N ). In this case, the edges are not bidirectional (e.g., account 1 follows account 2, but account 2 does not follow 1). We construct a directed variant of a WS network by starting with this directed ring lattice and rewiring each edge with probability β = 0.5 [35] . We rewire a directed edge ij from node i to node j by selecting a new node j uniformly at random from the nodes that account i does not currently follow; we remove the edge ij and add the edge ij . We construct the directed ER networks (a variant of the G(N, p) model) so that they have a mean out-degree of k = 25 (i.e., the mean number of non-media accounts that a node follows is k = 25). For the directed ER and WS networks, we construct a new network for each trial, so one should interpret the simulation results as a sample mean over many networks. Although all networks have the same number of non-media accounts, the region of parameter space in which the media has the most impact differs across different networks. This suggests that network architecture plays an important role in determining the level of media involvement that is necessary for media accounts to exert "global" influence in a network.
We now examine the media impact as we vary k, the mean number of non-media accounts that a non-media account follows, on similar network architectures. In Fig. 6 , we show heat maps of the media impact summary diagnostic for directed ER networks with different mean out-degrees. As we increase the mean out-degree k, we observe that media impact also increases.
We now perform numerical experiments in which we vary the size of the directed ER networks by varying the number of non-media accounts. To try to isolate the effect of network size, we fix the ratio of the mean number of non-media accounts that are followed (k) to the total number of non-media accounts (N ) for each simulation. As in our earlier observations, we see in Fig. 7 that the media impact increases as we increase the number N of non-media nodes. However, in this case, we observe a progressively larger spread in the media entrainment diagnostic R for progressively larger N . For example, for N = 1000 and k = 250, the spread of the media impact (which we define to be max{R} − min{R} over all (n M , M ) pairs) is approximately 88.2048 − 0.998 = 87.2068. However, for N = 50 and k = 13, the spread is approximately 1.4295 − 1.0364 = 0.3931 in our simulations.
In Fig. 8 , we illustrate the effect of varying the receptiveness parameter c. If the receptiveness is very small, non-media accounts in a network adjust their ideological positions only if the content that they see is very close to their current ideology. Consequently, we observe little or no media impact on the ideological positions of the nonmedia nodes in the network. For sufficiently large receptiveness, we observe the emergence of media impact on the mean ideological position of non-media nodes, with a larger impact for larger values of c.
As suggested by the individual trials in Fig. 2 , there is a relationship between time to convergence and media impact. As we illustrate in Fig. 9 , our simulations indicate that increased media impact is positively correlated with increased time to convergence.
IV. EXTENDING OUR MODEL TO TWO IDEOLOGICAL DIMENSIONS
We now move beyond one ideological dimension and examine our content-spreading model with two ideological dimensions. Suppose that, at time t, each account has an ideological position
We use the L 2 norm to represent the distance dist(x j , x i ) = x j − x i 2 in ideology between accounts i and j. Depending on context, this two-dimensional ideology may represent two different aspects of a political-bias spectrum (e.g., the first dimension may represent socially lib- 
FIG. 4:
Heat maps of the summary diagnostic R for media impact in the Facebook networks of various universities from the Facebook100 data set [33] illustrate that the greatest media impact occurs for moderate numbers of media accounts and moderate numbers of followers. The vertical axis is the number of media accounts (M ), the horizontal axis is the number of followers per media account (n M ), and the colors represent the mean impact summary diagnostic (R) over 50 trials. Blue represents the lowest levels of acceptance of the media ideology (i.e., smaller values of R), and red represents the highest.
eral versus socially conservative, whereas the second may represent preferred economic policies that very between socialism and capitalism); or it may represent political bias on multiple issues (e.g., immigration reform and gun control). Given our ideological space and choice of metric on this space, we then write our model as in Eq. (2). e.
A. Simulations
We simulate our content-spreading model with two ideological dimensions using a straightforward generalization of the simulations of our model with one ideological dimension. We add media accounts with a given ideology x M and assign their followers uniformly at random from the non-media accounts. In our examples, we initialize non-media accounts with ideological positions that we draw uniformly at random for each trial. (Therefore, it is again true that there is no spatial ordering of ideology in the network structure.)
We show a heat map of simulations of media impact in our model with two ideological dimensions in Fig. 10 . We observe qualitatively similar results as in our simulations of our content-spreading model with one-dimensional ideologies. We again see that the largest media impact (i.e., entrainment) does not occur for the largest numbers of media accounts and followers per media account. Instead, the largest entrainment occurs when there are a moderate number of media accounts, each of which has a moderate number of followers.
V. COMBINING MEDIA BIAS AND QUALITY
Thus far, we have used our content-spreading model to study the effects of media ideology on content-spreading in social networks. We now introduce the primary novel component of our work: incorporation of media content quality into our spreading model. Bessi et al. [5] observed that individuals are more likely to spread lowquality content if it confirms or supports their existing biases. We seek to incorporate such behavior into our content-spreading model.
We again denote the state of account i by x i . In our prior discussions, this state was a vector in d-dimensional ideological space (with d = 1 and d = 2 in our simulations). Now, however, we introduce an additional dimension into an account's current state to indicate the quality of shared content; therefore, we now take
We allow content quality to lie on a continuous spectrum, with values near x d+1,i = 0 representing propaganda and disinformation (e.g., clickbait or so-called "fake news") and values closer to x d+1,i = 1 representing substantive, thorough, fact-based material.
To focus our discussion, suppose that there is one ideological dimension, so d = 1 and
As before, suppose that accounts only adjust their ideological views based on content that is within a distance c of their current ideology. That is, 
FIG. 5:
Heat maps of the summary diagnostic R for media impact of various synthetic networks illustrate that the highest media impact occurs for moderate numbers of media accounts with moderate numbers of followers for a variety of network architectures. In the directed ring lattice, each non-media account follows k = 25 neighboring non-media accounts. We construct a variant of a Watts-Strogatz network from the ring lattice with k = 25, where we rewire follower connections with probability β = 0.5. In the directed variant of the Erdős-Rényi network, we take the mean out-degree (i.e., the mean number of non-media accounts followed) to be k = 25. In the star network, all non-media accounts follow one central non-media account. which also follows the peripheral non-media accounts. The vertical axis is the number of media accounts (M ), the horizontal axis is the number of followers per media account (n M ), and the colors represent the media impact diagnostic (R), which we compute as a mean over 200 trials. Blue represents the lowest levels of acceptance of media ideology (i.e., small values of R), and red represents the highest. For the directed ER and WS networks, we construct a new network for each of the 200 trials.
dist(x 1,i , x 1,j ) ≤ c. Additionally, we now also suppose that accounts also consider content quality when we determine receptiveness. Account i decides whether the content of account j is acceptable for spreading based on the distance dist(x 1,i , x 1,j ) between their ideological positions. If this distance is very small (e.g., close to 0), then this content supports account i's ideology, and i is more likely to spread it even if it is not high quality. However, if the distance in ideology is larger (e.g., close to c), then account i is more discerning and will tend to spread the content only when it is of sufficiently high quality. We quantify content discernment in the following way. We calculate the minimum acceptable quality q i,j as a linear function of distance in ideology between account i and account j. That is,
With this functional form of q i,j , account i spreads content that confirms its bias exactly regardless of quality, because the minimum acceptable quality is 0. If the content has an ideological position that equals the maximum receptive distance c away from account i's ideological position, then account i spreads the content only if it is of quality 1, the highest possible quality. The ideological-position updating rule with quality discernment is
where
and
We take the metric to be the L 2 norm dist(x i , x j ) = x 1,i − x 1,j 2 , so we are using the same ideology metric
FIG. 6: Heat maps of the media impact diagnostic R for directed ER networks with different values of the mean number k of non-media accounts that non-media accounts follow. Our simulations suggest that media impact is larger for progressively larger k. The vertical axis is the number of media accounts (M ), the horizontal axis is the number of followers per media account (n M ), and the colors represent the media impact diagnostic (R), which we average over 200 trials. Blue represents the lowest levels of acceptance of media ideology (i.e., small values of R), and red represents the highest.
is in our previous discussions. When a non-media node elects to spread content, we also adjust the quality of the content that it spreads with the update (12) which, along with Eq. (9), implies that
VI. MEASURING IMPACT FROM MULTIPLE SOURCES: MEDIA BIAS AND QUALITY
Earlier in our paper (see Sec. III B), we studied the effect of the numbers of media accounts and media followers per media account when media content has one fixed ideology. Our incorporation of content quality allows us to examine an important question of societal interest in a simple but plausible way: How do competing media accounts influence the outcome of opinions or ideological positions in a social network? This situation models a more realistic scenario of the influence of disparate news media (with heterogeneous political biases and content quality) in a social network. We extend our media entrainment summary diagnostic from our model with one ideological dimension to measure the impact of media accounts on the mean ideological position at convergence when there are multiple media sources. In this scenario, the quantity of interest is a function R(x) that represents the impact for each possible x.
To construct the function R(x), we first establish a baseline function r 0 (x) that represents the prevalence of each ideology for a given network in the absence of media accounts. Ideally, one might take r 0 (x) to be the probability that an account prefers content with ideological position x. In practice, we construct a function r 0 (x) by binning the ideology of content for each trial into bins of Heat maps of the media impact diagnostic R for directed ER networks with different numbers of non-media accounts (N ) for a fixed ratio (k/N ) of the mean number of non-media accounts that non-media accounts follow to the total number of non-media accounts. Our simulations suggest that both media impact R and the spread of the media impact (which we define to be max{R} − min{R} over all (n M , M ) pairs) increase with N . The vertical axis is the number of media accounts (M ), the horizontal axis is the number of followers per media account (n M ), and the colors represent the media impact diagnostic (R), which we average over 200 trials. Blue represents the lowest levels of acceptance of media ideology (i.e., small values of R), and red represents the highest. Unlike in our other figures, we have not scaled the color range to be the same across these four figures; this aids in visualizing the difference in the spread of impact values for networks of different sizes.
width δx; we count the number of times that content occurs in the ideology interval [x, x + δx], and we calculate a normalized histogram. Once we have constructed the baseline function r 0 (x), we use our previous strategy (see Section III B) to construct a function r i (x) that measures the prevalence of each ideology for a network in the presence of media accounts. That is, r i (x) is the distribution that describes the probability that a non-media account has ideological position x when there are media accounts in the network. We then use these functions to construct the media impact function R(x) = r i (x)−r b (x). Positive values of R(x) for ideology x indicate that the media has enhanced the prevalence of content with this ideology in the network, negative values indicate that the media has decreased the prevalence of content with this ideology in the network, and 0 indicates no change. In our model, it is interesting to consider a variety of distributions of media ideologies. For example, we can draw these opinions from a convenient synthetic probability distribution, or we can determine them from empirical data. First, using one ideological dimension, we consider two examples in which we draw media ideologies from synthetic probability distributions. In Fig. 11 , we show the media impact functions when there are M = 100 media accounts with ideologies that we draw (1) from a uniform distribution on [−1, 1] and (2) from a truncated Gaussian distribution on [−1, 1] with mean 0 and standard deviation 0.5. For each of these two examples, we examine the dependence of the media impact functions on the number n M of followers per media account.
We then showcase our model using a media distribution that we generate from hand-curated empirical observations of real-world media sources that incorporate both political ideology (in one dimension) and content quality (in the other dimension). This example includes M = 103 media accounts with ideological biases and qualities from Version 4.0 of the hand-curated Ad Fontes Media Bias Chart [36] . We rescale the ideology and quality chart coordinates so that they fall within the intervals of [−1, 1] and [0, 1], respectively. In Fig. 12 , we show these media content coordinates. These coordinates provide an illustrative example of a possible input to our model; one should not necessarily construe them as quantitatively representing the "true" ideologies of the depicted sources.
In Fig. 13 , we show the temporal evolution of one trial of our content-quality spreading model on the Reed College network with media account idealogies and qualities from the Media Bias Chart. We set each media account j to have a number n M,j of followers that is proportional to its number of followers on Twitter on 15 February 2019 at 17:36 Pacific Standard Time (under the constraint that each media source in the model has at least one follower, so we round up to one follower for some accounts). We select followers for each media account by selecting the non-media accounts whose initial conditions are closest in ideological position to that of the media account. That is, for each media account j (with j ∈ {1, . . . , M }) and each non-media account i (with i ∈ {1, . . . , N }), we calculate the distance dist(x 0 1,i , x 1,Mj ) in ideological position for all i at t = 0. From this set of all distances in ideological position from media account j, we select the n Mj smallest distances; these non-media accounts are the followers of media account j. In the simulations for which we use this media distribution as inputs, we observe the emergence of two primary communities ("echo chambers") of content: one in which the content is moderate ideologically and of fairly high quality (specifically, it is close to 0 in ideology and 0.75 in quality) and one in which the opinion is more conservative but of lower quality (specifically, about 0.5 in ideology and about 0.4 in quality). The polarization that results from simulations of our model is a reflection of the polarization in the ideology and quality of the media account distribution. In our simulations, the account for Fox News (which has an ideological position of 0.613636 and a quality of 0.3125 in the Media Bias Chart and is followed by 28% of non-media accounts) is very popular and near the final location of the conservative community in (ideology, quality) space.
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION
We introduced a model for the spread of content on an online social network, with both media and non-media nodes, that accounts for the effects of both ideology and content quality on the spreading dynamics. We based the spreading dynamics of our model on a bounded- In both panels, we run our simulations on a directed ER network with N = 100 non-media accounts that follow a mean of k = 25 non-media accounts.
confidence mechanism, such that accounts spread content that is sufficiently close to their current ideological position, as reflected by the content that they shared in the immediately previous time step. In the most sophisticated version of our model, the quality of content deter- for the mean number of non-media accounts that non-media accounts follow. We obtain qualitatively similar results as in our computations with one ideological dimension, but the mean media impact is less pronounced in this case. Specifically, the mean impact R is quantitatively smaller when using two ideological dimensions than what we observed previously when using one ideological dimension for directed ER networks with the same parameter values.) The vertical axis is the number of media accounts (M ), the horizontal axis is the number of followers per media account (n M ), and the colors represent the media impact diagnostic (R), which we average over 200 trials.
Blue represents the lowest levels of entrainment of media ideology, and red represents the highest. mines how close an account's ideological position should be to its ideological position for the account to share it; therefore, low-quality content is shared only when it supports an account's existing ideological biases. As far as we are aware, our model is the first mathematical model to explicitly incorporate the effects of media quality on spreading. This is a key novelty of our work. We showed simulation results for our content-spreading model for media content with both one and two ideological dimensions. Using results from our simulations, we quantified the level of media "entrainment" (i.e., how much the media affects the ideological positions of nonmedia accounts) in a variety of network architectures. We examined how the amount of media entrainment of the non-media accounts in a specified network depends on the numbers of media accounts and followers per media account for that network. We found that media impact increases when one increases the number of nonmedia accounts, the mean number of non-media connec- tions, or the receptiveness of non-media accounts. We also observed a relationship between media entrainment and convergence time in our model, with higher levels of media entrainment correlating positively with longer convergence times. Finally, we simulated a version of our model that accounts for content quality in the spreading dynamics. Using a hand-curated set of media inputs from real media outlets and their online followerships, we demonstrated that this version of our model produces polarization in both ideology and quality of content. Specifically, it yields a community of high-quality content in the center of the political spectrum and a conservative community of low-quality content. Our model provides a useful step towards increasing understanding of how media content quality affects the spread of online content. There are several worthwhile ways to generalize our model. For example, our assumption that accounts choose whether to spread content based on a universal confidence parameter c is a naive simplification, as is the homogeneity of non-media accounts in general. Spreading behavior surely depends on individual characteristics, as has been explored in models that include zealots [37] and in other models of social dynamics [21, 38, 39] . Augmenting our model of content spreading by incorporating account heterogeneity is important future work. In such efforts, we expect that it will be insightful to explore the effects of structural homophily. Individuals in social networks are free to choose which accounts to follow (and which accounts to stop following or never follow), and such choices are sometimes driven by the desire to follow accounts that have similar ideologies [4, 5] . This can increase structural homophily and exaggerate echo chambers [20] in networks, as edges are more likely to occur between nodes with similar ideologies.
Another interesting avenue is to generalize the dynamics in multiple ideological dimensions by allowing different weightings of the ideological dimensions and to incorporate spreading through multiple types of social media by generalizing our model to multilayer networks [40] . Although we only examined a few case studies of media probability distributions in the present paper, a strength of our model is its generality. One can draw the number of media accounts, number of followers per account, and ideologies and quality of media content from a probability distribution -either synthetic ones or ones that are inferred from empirical data -and it is important to explore these ideas in future work. It is particularly desirable for media nodes in a content-spreading model to produce content that follows some distribution of ideologies and qualities, rather than always having the same FIG. 12: Distribution of media accounts in (ideology, quality) space. We include M = 103 media accounts, which are hand-curated and available from the Ad Fontes Media Bias Chart [36] . Each colored dot represents one media account. The horizontal coordinate represents the ideological position of an account's political content, and the vertical coordinate represents the quality of its political content. The size of a dot represents the number of followers of the associated Twitter account. The five labeled accounts are the ones that are followed by at least 25 % of the non-media accounts in our numerical experiments.
parameter values for such features. It would also be very interesting to include media nodes whose ideologies x M are inferred from data, such as through sentiment analysis on news stories on a given topic (as described in [18] and references therein). Using procedures such as topic modeling and sentiment analysis can generate a probability distribution of media accounts in ideological space as an output, which can then be fed into our model. One very recent effort in this direction, with intent to measure media bias and quality from web pages and tweets of media sources, is a paper by Ye and Skiena [41] . Another important issue is to examine transient dynamics of content spreading, as it is necessary to go beyond on our focus on the properties after ideological positions converge to a steady state in a network. Another key generalization is to explore how the dynamics of our content updating rule are affected by time-dependence in network architecture (such as in temporal networks [42] and adaptive networks [43] ), as accounts can follow new accounts and unfollow accounts (perhaps modeled in a simplified setting as network rewiring, as in adaptive voter models [44] ).
Developing mathematical approaches for analyzing and quantifying the dynamics of content spreading, such as the model that we introduced in the present paper, has ramifications for how to mitigate the spread of undesired content and promote the spread of desired content online. One potential impact is the development of control strategies and "fake-news filters" (e.g., by flagging content that is below some threshold value on the quality axis in a framework such as ours) that are reminiscent of spam filters. Our work provides a step toward the development of novel algorithms to encourage selective spreading of high-quality or desirable content. Another area where further development of such models may also be fruitful is in bot detection, where most existing algorithms rely on network measures, followership data, activity rates, or linguistic cues [7] (all of which are straightforward to manipulate by malicious actors), rather than directly on spreading dynamics. Advances in these modeling efforts will also yield insights into the theory of content spreading online and help bridge the gap between simple spreading models and realistic investigations of spreading on social media.
